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Abstract. Modern automotive systems increasingly rely on software
and network connectivity for new functions and features. Security of
the software and communications of the on-board system of systems be-
comes a critical concern for the safety of new generation vehicles. Besides
methods and tools, safety and security of automotive systems requires
frameworks of standards for holistic process and assurance. As a part of
our ongoing work, this paper investigates the possibility of a combined
safety and security approach to standards in the automotive domain. We
examine existing approaches in the railway and avionics domain with
similar challenges and identify specific requirements for the automotive
domain. We evaluate ISO 15408 as a potential candidate for a combined
safety and security approach for complementing automotive safety stan-
dard ISO 26262, and discuss their points of alignment.
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1 Introduction
State of the art automotive systems are becoming increasingly software depen-
dent and interconnected. It is estimated that around 90% of new features are
enabled by programmable systems and connectivity, which transforms automo-
tive from mechanical devices to complex cyber-physical systems where multiple
networks interconnect up to 100 Electronic Control Units (ECU) within a vehicle
[1]. Communications enable vehicles to interact with each other (V2V) and with
the outside environment (V2I) for new functions and increase driver safety and
comfort. The benefits are obvious, from applications such as remote tracking, un-
locking the doors, remote diagnosis, over the air updates (OTA), to automated
e-call in case of emergency.
The complexity of in-vehicle system of systems (SoS) and the inter-connectivity
are growing. While the number of ECU’s is increased only by a factor of 1.45
over the last five years, the total size of application software is increased by a
factor of 4.5 during the same period [1]. A survey showed that in the next years
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connectivity will be a distinguishing feature for automotive systems. Consumers
expect connectivity with their private devices and with the outside environment
[18]. This will add additional complexity to the automotive system of systems,
where currently up to 4 kilometer of wiring are used to connect up to 10 differ-
ent types of on-board networks with multiple forms of outside connectivity [15].
Such connectivity enables new application classes for automotive systems, which
includes eco/green/mobility, convenience, crash avoidance, safety awareness and
emergency applications [17].
At such a scale of complexity and connectivity, serious security concerns
arise in the automotive domain. Recent events and analysis demonstrated that
the current ad-hoc approach towards security engineering in the automotive
domain delivers sub-optimal results. A recent survey by the U.S. Senate showed
that most car manufactures did not follow a structured and systematic approach
towards security engineering [20]. While all responding car manufactures stated
that their vehicles offer one or more wireless connections, only one of them was
able to provide information on threats and vulnerabilities. Experimental analysis
of systems like the wireless tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) [13], the
external automotive attack surfaces [3], surveys of potential security threats [21]
and telematics unit [7] all support the conclusion in the survey. Furthermore, the
capability and processes to address vulnerability and conduct security testing are
also underdeveloped.
Being safety-critical, the automotive domain has a set of established safety
standards, which are used to design safety-critical components and systems and
ensure that all safety risks are reduced to a tolerable level. However, security for
safety-critical systems is a relatively new challenge. As safety can no longer guar-
anteed if security fails, the question is how to take security into consideration in
the existing safety standards. For adding security to safety in the automotive do-
main, it is worthwhile to look at similar issues in railway and avionics. As shown
by a recent study [2] in the railway domain, where similar security challenges
arise [19], solving them is not restricted to identifying a need for security and
safety and defining new methods. Systematic approaches that address safety and
security equally are needed. In the railway domain, the ISO 15408 (Information
technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security (Common
Criteria)) [12] and the IEC 62443 (Industrial communication networks - Network
and system security - Security for industrial automation and control systems) [9]
have the potential to address security. The author of the study [2] proposed to
use IEC 62443 as a suitable addition to established safety standards. It was also
proposed to add the requirements for security level 1 to the EN 5012x standards
series. The avionics domain takes a different approach and started to develop
its own security standards. The generic safety standard IEC 61508 [10] was ex-
tended with security related requirements in the second edition and there is
ongoing activity to extend this in the third edition.
In the automotive domain, ISO 26262 [11] is the established safety standard.
It is currently in revision. The focus is on the addition and identification of
safety-cybersecurity interface points, points in the safety lifecycle for informa-
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tion exchange or combined activities and work products1 with security. As a
part of our ongoing work on safety and security co-engineering for the automo-
tive domain, this paper investigates how to extend existing safety standards to
address security concerns. Given the complexity of the problem, we envision a
standard framework with several standards cover the whole area of safety and
security. Our main contributions in this paper include:
– we identify requirements for suitable security standards for automotive safety,
review and compare automotive safety standard ISO 26262 and security stan-
dard ISO 15408,
– we identify important work products and approaches in both standards for
points of alignment,
– we propose an alignment of Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) and
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), and discuss its feasibility.
In the following, Section 2 briefly discusses related work; Section 3 and 4
review the ISO 26262 and ISO 15408 standard, respectively; Section 5 presents
our comparison and a proposal for alignment; Section 6 concludes the paper with
a discussion of potential challenges and further steps.
2 Related work
Automotive industry has a long history of following and implementing strin-
gent safety requirements. With the rapid development and integration of ICT
components, the need for a tighter coupling of safety and security for connected
safety-critical systems becomes necessary. The issue has attracted attentions in
recent years. Macher et al. [16] developed a security extended hazard analysis
and risk assessment methodology for the automotive domain and reported that
they were able to identify 34% more hazardous situations in industrial use cases.
Multiple studies demonstrated the different possibilities of interactions between
safety and security [6, 8, 22]. A survey of safety and security for the industrial
domain [14] listed 37 methods for co-engineering.
Furthermore, specific challenges for the safety engineering in the automotive
domain have been identified in [5]. A domain independent approach towards a
combined safety and security lifecycle is proposed in [4].
3 ISO 26262
ISO 26262 is a domain specific instantiation of IEC 61508, the generic safety
standard [10]. It follows a risk based approach and is mainly based around safety
integrity levels, safety goals and safety concepts.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the safety lifecycle defined in ISO 26262. De-
velopment of a new item starts in the concept phase with the item definition,
1 A work product is the result of an activity related to a requirement.
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Fig. 1. Safety Lifecycle according to ISO 26262
initiation of the safety lifecycle, hazard analysis and risk assessment and defini-
tion of the functional safety concept. During hazard analysis and risk assessment,
potential hazards are identified and the risks are investigated. The risk rating
depends on the driving situation in which a hazard occurs, the potential con-
trollability of the situation and the severity of the caused harm. Depending on
the risks, safety goals are defined. An automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) is
assigned to each safety goal. ASIL ranges from D for the most stringent level of
safety measures to A for the most lenient level of safety measures. For systems
with lower risks, quality management activities are sufficient.
Based on the safety goals, functional safety requirements are derived and
assigned to preliminary architectural elements. The functional safety concept is
compromised of all functional safety requirements and describes the functionality
to achieve the safety goal.
Next step is the product development on system level. During this step the
technical safety requirements are specified, the system is designed, hardware and
software of the item are integrated and tested, compliance and correctness of the
safety goals and their implementation is validated and the functional safety is
assessed. Complementary to the functional safety concept, the technical safety
concept consists of all technical safety requirements and describes how the func-
tional safety requirements are implemented in hardware or software. The system
development includes hardware and software development. During the hardware
development, hardware safety requirements are specified, the hardware is de-
signed, observation of hardware architectural metrics in regard to fault handling
is assessed and potential violation of safety goals due to random hardware fail-
ures are evaluated. The hardware development is concluded with integration and
testing. In a similar manner software design starts with the specification of soft-
ware safety requirements, the design of the software architecture, and the design
and implementation of the individual software units. It is concluded by testing
of the units, software integration and integration testing and verification of the
software safety requirements.
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Additional parts of ISO 26262 are concerned with production and operation
and safety analysis for determining the ASIL. The final evidence for the func-
tional safety of an item is the safety case which summarizes all work products
from the ISO 26262. A particularity in the ISO 26262 is the Safety Element out
of Context (SEooC). A SEooC is an element for which the final item and oper-
ating environment is not known during design and development. It is therefore
developed using assumptions and hypothesis. This assumptions have to be con-
firmed in order to safely integrate a SEooC in a item. A SEooC can be verified,
the validation occurs during the item development.
4 ISO 15048, Common Criteria
Comparing with most safety standards, the ISO 15048 follows a different ap-
proach. While safety defines a system lifecycle and an engineering approach,
ISO 15048 focuses on the evaluation and assurance of the system security.
The Target of Evaluation (ToE) is evaluated based on security specifications
with different levels of generality. A Protection Profile (PP) is a implementa-
tion independent specification of security requirements for a class of systems. A
Security Target (ST) is the implementation specific specification of security re-
quirements for a system. Since automotive protection profiles are more of an idea
for future work, we will focus on the security target definition. An ST consists
of the definition of the ST, the conformance claim to any protection profiles,
the definition of the security problem and the security objectives, the extended
components definition, the security requirements and the TOE summary speci-
fication. Figure 2 gives an overview about the contents of an security target.
An ST is intended as a specification of the security properties of a TOE and
as a definition for the scope of the evaluation. It is not intended as a detailed
or complete specification for the design or implementation of a system. It is
explicitly mentioned in the ISO 15408: ”This means that in general an ST may
be part of a complete specification.”[12].
The assumptions in the security problem definition (cf. Figure 2) describe
assumptions about the operating environment of a TOE. If a TOE is placed in
operational situations where these assumptions are not true, the TOE may not
be able to provide its security functionality. ISO 15408 differs between the Secu-
rity Functional Requirements (SFR) and the Security Assurance Requirements
(SAR). The SFRs are a formalized and implementation independent specifica-
tion how the security objectives are achieved. The SARs describe how and to
which strictness a TOE is evaluated. Evaluation assurance levels (EAL) describe
seven sets of SARs with rising strictness. The TOE summary specification finally
describes how a TOE implements the SFRs.
Using properly, ISO 15408 can increase software and hardware security as-
surance level. It provides the assurance by enforcing good and comprehensive
documentation during the system design and development phase, including sys-
tem specification, system internals, system tests, and development tools. It also
forces a development team to take security as the main objective from the begin-
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Fig. 2. Security Target contents according to ISO 15408
ning of the project. It raises awareness of the security problems throughout the
system’s design and development phase, in which both security and non-security
team members are invovled. The specification of PP, SFRs, and SARs, defined in
accordance with ISO 15408 will provide comprehensive and clear specifications
on the requirements of critical parts in the automotive system. Such an intensive
practice can force the project team to identify ambiguities early on and solve
the identified problems accordingly.
5 Comparison and points for interaction
To complement automotive safety standard ISO 26262 and to promote a com-
bined approach to safety and security, we identified the following requirements
for the evaluation of candidate security standards:
1. There should be an overlap in required work products for safety and security
argumentation. It should be possible to build a holistic assurance case which
reuses and extends existing work products for safety argumentation and
combine them with security related work products.
2. Assurance levels between safety and security should be translatable. Verifica-
tion activities for safety and security should be on a similar level. Strictness
of required documentation, design, testing and verification should be similar
between pure safety goals and security motivated safety goals.
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3. Approaches and concepts from the ISO 26262 should be mirrored by the
security standard. ISO 26262 supports some automotive specific approaches,
like the Safety Element out of Context. Such approaches and concepts should
be representable by the security standard.
Based on these requirements, we investigate the feasibility of using ISO 15408
to complement ISO 26262 for safety and security.
5.1 Work products
Table 1 shows a comparison of work products from the two standards. It can be
seen that for the required parts of a security target, existing work products from
the ISO 26262 contain similar, or in some parts, overlapping content. However,
it does not imply a complete overlap between safety and security work products.
Numbers in the ISO 15408 column refer to part 1 of the standard. The reference
to parts of ISO 26262 are given for each specific requirement.
Table 1. Work products from ISO 15408 and ISO 26262
ISO 15408 ISO 26262
A.4.1 ST reference and TOE reference
Part3-5: Item definitionA.4.2 TOE overview
A.4.3 TOE description
A.5 conformance claims -
A.6.2 Threats Part3-7.5.1: Hazard analysis and risk assessment
A.6.3 Organisational security
policies
Part2-5: Overall safety management,
Part2-5.5.1: Organization specific rules and processes for functional safety
Part2-7: Safety management after release for production,
Part2-7.5: Evidence of a field monitoring process
A.6.4 Assumptions Only for Safety element out of Context
A7.2.1 Security objectives for the
TOE
Part3.7.5.2: Safety Goals
A7.2.2 Security objectives for the
operational environment
-
A7.3. Relation between security
objectives and the security problem definition
Part3-7.5.3: Verification review of hazard analysis and risk assessment and safety goals
A.8 Extended components definition -
A.9.1 Security functional
requirements
Part3-8.5.1: Functional safety concept
A.9.2 Security assurance requirements
Part2-6: Safety management during development of the item,
Part2-6.5.5: Confirmation plan
Part6-11:Verification of software safety requirements
Part6-11.5.1: Software verification plan
A.9.3 Security requirements rationale
A.10 TOE summary specification Part2-6.5.3: Safety Case
The table lists safety work products from ISO 26262 that are best suited to be
extended with their security specific counterpart from ISO 15408. It will define
a holistic assurance case, which integrates required parts for the safety case with
the mandatory parts for a security target. For example, the item definition of
ISO 26262 contains mission, functional and non-functional requirements, depen-
dencies between the item and its outside and already known safety requirements
from familiar items. In addition, the boundaries, interfaces, elements, distribu-
tion of functions, operating scenarios and requirements from and on other items
are described. The item description already contains most required parts of the
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TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE description. It needs to be extend with
an overview of the included security features and the functionality of the item.
While the conformance claim has no direct counterpart in ISO 26262, the next
row demonstrates how a safety work product may be extended. The goal of the
hazard analysis and risk assessment is to identify and evaluate all hazards for an
item and to formulate the safety goals to achieve the necessary risk reduction.
The intention of ISO 15408 is similar, in which a list of all undesired actions
from a threat agent may have negatively influence on one or more properties.
Extending the hazard analysis and risk assessment with a list of potential threat
scenarios that negatively influence the safety of the item can be used for safety
and security argumentation.
5.2 Assurance levels
ISO 15408 follows a strict assignment of measures to levels, while ISO 26262 has
levels of highly recommend, recommend and methods without recommendation.
The different EAL can be summarized as:
– EAL1: functionally tested
– EAL2: structurally tested
– EAL3: methodically tested and checked
– EAL4: methodically designed, tested and reviewed
– EAL5: semi-formally designed and tested
– EAL6: semi-formally verified design and tested
– EAL7: formally verified design and tested.
Since EAL and security in general relates mostly to software design, im-
plementation and testing, we based our structuring of the ASIL mostly on the
ASIL dependent requirements for this part of the complete system engineering.
However, at the moment, there is no absolute direct translation and mapping.
For example, formal methods are only recommend for the highest ASIL, while
semi-formal methods are highly recommend for ASIL D and C.
Based on a examination of the ISO 26262 requirements, a translation between
EAL and ASIL, based on their strictness and degree of formalism is proposed as
following.
– ASIL A: EAL3
– ASIL B: EAL4
– ASIL C: EAL5
– ASIL D: EAL6
Similar to the conversion from SIL to ASIL, where the highest SIL is more
critical than the highest ASIL, in a summarized translation, EAL7 would be out
of reach. A more elaborate approach might be to build a specific set of SAR
tailored according to the requirements from ISO 26262. ISO 15408 allows such
an approach with the EALX+ specification. It describes a set of requirement
which exceeds EALX in strictness in some parts but does not reach the next
EAL. This would allow a more accurate translation.
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5.3 Automotive domain specific concepts
Compared to the generic safety standard IEC 61508, the automotive domain
has defined a few domain-specific concepts in ISO 26262. As described in [2], it
becomes challenging to add security to safety if attack probabilities are to be
considered. Probability estimation in ISO 26262 is based on the concept of “how
frequently and for how long individuals find themselves in a situation where the
aforementioned hazardous event can occur.” In ISO 26262, this is defined to be
a measure of the probability of the driving scenario taking place in which the
hazardous event can occur (E = exposure) [11]. As shown in[16], the risk rating
for ISO 26262 is therefore well suited for an integration of security threats. One
can simply redefine exposure as probability that a driving scenario takes place
in which a cyber attack is possible and therefor causes a hazardous event. The
determined ASIL for security motivated safety goals can then be translated to
an EAL for the corresponding security objective.
An important concept in the ISO 26262 is the SEooC. It enables supplier
to develop components for different OEMs and to carry out safety engineering
based on the assumed usage and operational environment of the component.
ISO 15408 supports a similar concept with the dependency on the operational
environment for security. The final assessment depends in both cases on the
operational environment.
6 Conclusion
Automotive systems become increasingly software-intensive and interconnected.
This makes security a burning issue and attracts many attentions in recent
years. Cooperation between safety and security standards is urgently needed in
the automotive domain. As a part of our on-going work on safety and secu-
rity co-engineering, we investigate the possibility of a framework of standards
that addresses safety and security in automotive domain in a holistic and co-
operative way. We investigate domains with similar safety-critical requirements
and evaluate ISO 15408 and ISO 26262 to find points that have the potential
for combinations.
As a work-in-progress, out next step is to conduct more in-depth analyzes of
existing automotive safety and security standards. Specifically, we will address
the challenge of how to align and harmonize assurance levels on safety and
security in different standards.
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